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“Democracy” is government by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the peo­
ple and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system.
The Employee Free Choice Act (the “EFCA”) is bipartisan legislation that would, 
among other provisions, eliminate the requirement of a secret ballot vote during a 
union organizing campaign, and instead, require the certification of a union that is able 
to demonstrate that it has the support of a simple majority of employees in a work­
place. During the 2008 United States presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged 
his support for the EFCA and declared that its passage was a matter of “when”, not 
“if ’. President Obama’s ardent support of these fundamental changes to the National 
Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) has led policy makers, labour practitioners, and 
lawyers to contemplate the impact that these amendments could have on workplaces 
across the United States.
Numerous papers and articles have commented on the effect the imple­
mentation of a “card check” certification process and resulting loss of a secret bal­
lot certification vote will have on the rights of employees to freely choose represen­
tation within their workplace. Others have attempted to compare the situation the 
passage of the EFCA would create to that of a number of Canadian jurisdictions 
which have adopted a card check union certification system. In this paper, we will 
approach the issue from a different angle, considering the labour relations climate 
in Ontario over the past twenty years and identifying potential relationships between 
the legislation in place at specific times and the health of the provincial economy.
After reviewing the EFCA as it has been proposed and various labour rela­
tions provisions in place in Ontario over the past twenty years, we will contrast the 
increases in union density rates under a card check system with union density rates 
under a secret ballot system. We will then explore research indicating that union­
ized businesses are linked to stagnated or decreased productivity, profits, innovation, 
investment, and employment growth. Finally, we will review and analyze the pos­
sible economic impacts of one of the other notable provisions in the EFCA, which 
guarantees expedited and automatic access to first contract arbitration. The paper 
will conclude by reinforcing the point that legislation such as the EFCA can have
deleterious effects on the economy—particularly during uncertain economic times. 
THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
The EFCA is bipartisan legislation that was first introduced by Senator Ed­
ward Kennedy and House Representatives George Miller and Peter King in 
2007. Proponents of the EFCA claim that it is important remedial legisla­
tion that will help to strengthen the depleted American middle class by remov­
ing barriers to unionization and collective bargaining. The EFCA purports to ac­
complish these goals through three key amendments to the NLRA including:
♦ Eliminating the requirement of a secret ballot vote by 
mandating certification of a union that is able to demon­
strate, through signed authorization cards, that it has the 
support of a simple majority of employees in the proposed 
bargaining unit.
♦ Ensuring that a newly certified union is able to achieve a 
first collective agreement by permitting either party (union 
or employer) to request mandatory federal mediation if a 
collective agreement cannot be reached within ninety days 
of the commencement of negotiations. If after thirty days 
of mediation the parties have failed to reach an agreement 
the dispute is referred to binding first contract arbitration.
♦ Establishing harsh penalties for employers that are found 
to have engaged in anti-union tactics intended to thwart 
unionization efforts during the organizing campaigns and 
first contract negotiations, including triple damages in cer­
tain unfair labour practice cases.
In the spring of 2007, despite passing in the U.S. House of Representatives 
and enjoying majority support in the Senate, the EFCA was blocked by a Republi­
can filibuster. Labour law reformers renewed their hopes when then-Senator Obama 
promised during the 2008 Presidential campaign that he would include the EFCA as 
a fundamental part of his economic stimulus plan. However, since the election it 
has appeared that President Obama’s enthusiasm for the bill is waning.1 Some com­
mentators have speculated that President Obama is reluctant to push legislation that 
promises to be deeply divisive early in his presidency, particularly in light of his 
stated desire to heal the partisan rift that grew during his predecessor’s term. Oth­
ers have cited the lack of a Democratic supermajority in the Senate and the current 
economic crisis in the United States as reasons the new administration appears to
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be placing a lower priority on the passage of the EFCA than was initially planned.
We suggest that it is this last reason, the current economic crisis, that is 
the most compelling explanation for the reduced urgency in pushing the legisla­
tion forward. To illustrate the impact that legislation similar to the EFCA can have 
on an economy, we will now review labour laws in Ontario over a twenty-year 
period as well as the economic performance of the province during that period.
THE ONTARIO EXPERIENCE (1986-2005)
Ontario’s experience with the secret ballot vote and card check systems between 1986 
and 2005 can be broken into three discrete periods in which three discrete certification 
systems were used: the traditional card check system from 1986 until 1993, a modified 
card check system from 1993 until 1996, and a certification vote system from 1996 
until 2005.
The details and effects of each of these systems will be further explained 
below but will make reference to the information found in Figure 1 and Charts 1 and 2.
Figure 12: Ontario Labour Relations Board
Number of Applications for Certification Disposed of
Year Total Certified Dismissed Percentage
Certified
1986-1987 655 496 159 75.7%
1987-1988 627 493 134 78.6%
1988-1989 532 441 91 82.9%
1989-1990 506 390 116 77.1%
1990-1991 478 373 105 78.0%
1991-1992 474 409 65 86.3%
1992-1993 461 396 65 85.9%
1993-1994 785 711 74 90.6%
1994-1995 693 630 63 90.9%
1995-1996 533 425 108 79.7%
1996-1997 443 297 146 67.0%
1997-1998 474 348 126 73.4%
1998-1999 484 344 140 71.1%
2 Ontario, Ontario Labour Relations Board, Annual Reports (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1986 to 2005). 
Note: Statistics are compiled for the fiscal year of the Ontario Labour Relations Board which is April 1 to 
March 31 and therefore, the “Year” 1986-1987 is April 1,1986 to March 31,1987. These statistics do not 
consider applications for certification in the construction industry or applications which were withdrawn.
1999-2000 411 256 155 62.3%
2000-2001 661 463 198 70.0%
2001-2002 391 253 138 64.7%
2002-2003 380 250 130 65.8%
2003-2004 352 237 115 67.3%
2004-2005 368 235 133 63.9%
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Traditional Card Check System (1986 to 1992)5
From 1986 until 1992, the Ontario Labour Relations Act (the “Act”) provided for a 
card check certification process without the requirement of a secret ballot vote. Under 
this version of the Act, a trade union could apply to be certified without a vote if it 
supplied the Ontario Labour Relations Board (the “Board”) with authorization cards 
signed within the previous six months on behalf of more than 55 percent of employees 
in an appropriate bargaining unit. Alternatively, if the union had authorization cards 
signed within the previous year on behalf of at least 35 percent of employees in an ap­
propriate bargaining unit, it would be entitled to request a secret ballot vote.
This period of labour relations regulations also had the following significant 
provisions:
♦ A fifteen-day period after an application for certification 
was filed during which an employee or employees could 
submit a “petition” which would negate their previously 
signed authorization card;
♦ The Board had the discretion to order a secret ballot vote 
even if the union exhibited membership support on behalf 
of more than 55 percent of employees;
♦ Remedial certification where an employer violated the
4 Ibid.
5 Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, as amended.
Act such that the true wishes of employees were not likely 
to be ascertained in a vote and the union exhibited card- 
based support adequate for the purposes of collective bar­
gaining;
♦ Access to first contract arbitration where collective bar­
gaining had been unsuccessful because of; (a) the refusal 
of the employer to recognize the bargaining authority of 
the trade union; (b) the uncompromising nature of any 
bargaining position adopted by the respondent without 
reasonable justification; (c) the failure of the respondent 
to make reasonable or expeditious efforts to conclude a 
collective agreement; or (d) any other reason the Board 
considered relevant; and
♦ Mandatory union dues deductions if requested by the 
union.
Given the availability of the card check certification process, it is not surpris­
ing that the Board certified the applicant trade union in approximately 80.6 per­
cent of the applications it disposed of during this period. It is notable, however, 
that during this period, trade union support across the province was dropping 
and the Board considered a steadily decreasing number of applications for cer­
tification each year (655 in fiscal 1986-1987 dropping to 461 in fiscal 1992-1993).
Modified Card Check System (1993 to 1996)6
In 1990, a provincial election radically changed the ideological orientation of the 
government of Ontario as a left-wing political party, the New Democratic Party (the 
“NDP”), came into power. The NDP has historical roots in the former Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation, which was based on a commitment to a “planned sys­
tem of social economy for the production, distribution and exchange of all goods 
and services” and “social ownership, development, operation and control of utili­
ties and natural resources”.7 Simply put, the NDP platform was based on a commit­
ment to democratic socialism and providing a voice for workers within the province.
Shortly after entering office, the government proposed Bill 40, legislation 
which would radically change Ontario’s Act} This legislation was passed in late 1992 
and came into force on 1 January 1993. The Bill 40 amendments maintained the 
card check certification process already in the Act and added the following significant 
amendments:
6 Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2, as amended.
7 W.S. Wallace, ed., The Encyclopedia o f Canada, Vol. II, (Toronto: University Associates of Canada, 
1948) at 125-126; Ibid.
8 Bill 40, An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and Employment, d.2nd Sess., 
35th Leg., 1992.
♦♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
The purpose of the Act was amended to read:
1. To ensure that workers can freely exercise the right to or­
ganize by protecting the right of employees to choose, join 
and be represented by a trade union of their choice and to 
participate in the lawful activities of the trade union.
2. To encourage the process of collective bargaining so as 
to enhance,
i. the ability of employees to negotiate terms and con­
ditions of employment with their employer,
ii. the extension of co-operative approaches between 
employers and trade unions in adapting to changes in 
the economy, developing work force skills and pro­
moting workplace productivity, and
iii. increased employee participation in the workplace.
3. To promote harmonious labour relations, industrial sta­
bility and the ongoing settlement of differences between 
employers and trade unions.
4. To provide for effective, fair and expeditious methods of 
dispute resolution.
The petition system permitting employee(s) to cancel au­
thorization card(s) after an application for certification 
was filed was repealed;
The Board was required to order a secret ballot vote if the 
trade union provided membership evidence on behalf of at 
least 40 percent and not more than 55 percent of employ­
ees in an appropriate bargaining unit;
Unions were provided with statutory access to workplaces 
in public locations (i.e. shopping malls) for the purposes 
of organizing;
The Board was provided with both the authority to expe­
dite hearings and to order the interim reinstatement of an 
employee in circumstances where a trade union asserted 
that the termination of the employee occurred during the 
union’s organizing campaign and was based, in part, on 
anti-union animus;
In circumstances where the true wishes of the employees 
were not likely to be ascertained because the employer 
had violated the Act, the Board had the discretion to cer­
tify the employer, even in circumstances where the trade 
union could not exhibit card-based support adequate for 
the purposes of collective bargaining;
Parties were granted automatic access to first contract in­
terest arbitration thirty days after parties were in a legal 
strike or lockout position and the Board also had the pow-
er to settle collective agreement terms where one party 
breached its duty to bargain in good faith; and
♦ Employers were prohibited from employing replacement 
workers during strikes or lockouts.
Notably, Bill 40 repealed the “petition” system which had allowed employees 
who had a change of heart after having signed an authorization card to revoke the card 
within a period of time following the filing of the application for certification. Under 
the Bill 40 amendments, any employee who had a change of heart was required to 
contact the Board prior to the filing of an application for certification to revoke or can­
cel an authorization card (not on or following the date that the application was filed).
The amendments were clearly a reaction to the support trade unions had pro­
vided to the NDP and were welcomed by the labour movement. Buoyed by these new­
found opportunities to organize, the number of applications for certification jumped 70 
percent in the first year after the enactment of Bill 40. The percentage of applications 
that resulted in certification of the union also rocketed to over 90 percent.
Certification Vote System (1996 to 2005)9
After approximately four years of NDP government that included in­
creases in corporate taxes, increases in government spending and a pro­
tracted recession, the Progressive Conservative Party won the 1995 provin­
cial election. This party campaigned on a platform of reduced government 
spending and modifications to what it termed “anti-employer legislation” includ­
ing the removal of most of the Bill 40 amendments to the Labour Relations Act.
Shortly after its election, the Progressive Conservative Party proposed and 
passed Bill 7, which removed virtually all of the amendments made in 1993 by Bill 
40 and made a number of additional amendments to the Act.10 Most notably, the card 
check certification system in Ontario was repealed and replaced with a mandatory se­
cret ballot process for every application for certification where a trade union was able 
to demonstrate to the Board that it had authorization cards on behalf of 40 percent or 
more of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. Additionally, under the new 
Act, the Board lost the power to automatically certify an employer, regardless of any 
unlawful conduct committed by an employer during an organizing campaign.
Other amendments in Bill 7 included:
♦ Repeal and replacement of the Bill 40 “purpose section” 
to read that the purpose of the Act is:
1. To facilitate collective bargaining between employers and
9 Labour Relations Act, 1995, R.S.O. 1995, c. l,Sched.A.
10 Bill 7, Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, Is* Sess., 36th Leg., 1995.
trade unions that are the freely-designated representatives 
of the employees.
2. To recognize the importance of workplace parties adapt­
ing to change.
3. To promote flexibility, productivity and employee in­
volvement in the workplace.
4. To encourage communication between employers and 
employees in the workplace.
5. To recognize the importance of economic growth as the 
foundation for mutually beneficial relations amongst em­
ployers, employees and trade unions.
6. To encourage co-operative participation of employers and 
trade unions in resolving workplace issues.
7. To promote the expeditious resolution of workplace dis­
putes.
♦ A one-year bar on any subsequent application for certifica­
tion after an application was dismissed following a certi­
fication vote; and
♦ The first contract arbitration provisions found in the Act 
prior to 1993 were re-introduced.
The impact of Bill 7 on labour relations in the province was felt al­
most immediately as the number of applications for certification filed with the 
Board decreased to the level experienced prior to the Bill 40 amendments to the 
Act. The number of applications for certification which were ultimately decided 
in favour of the trade union dropped dramatically to below 70 percent. This trend 
has continued throughout the decade following these amendments to the Act.11
CARD BASED APPLICATION AND ITS IMPACT ON UNION DENSITY
Statistics from jurisdictions permitting a card check system of unionization, including 
Ontario until 1996, indicate that a card check system increases the number of appli­
cations for certification that are ultimately decided in favour of a trade union. The 
evidence from Ontario is particularly telling as it illustrates that trade unions were 
successful in their applications for certification between 75 and 90 percent of the time, 
while certificates were only granted 65 to 70 percent of the time when the secret ballot 
process was required.
The remarkable divergence in union density in the U.S. and Canada since 
the late 1960s may be attributed to the existence of a card check system of unioniza­
tion in some Canadian jurisdictions. Chart 3 below shows that, until the mid-1960s,
11 During the 2000-2001 fiscal year, the province experienced a higher than normal level of applications 
for certification in the health and welfare services sector as a result of the attempts of one union to displace 
another union within the sector. As a result, approximately 160 additional applications for certification 
were filed during this year.
unionization rates in the U.S. and Canada were essentially the same. In the early- to 
mid-1960s, union density in both countries was approximately 30 percent. Thereafter, 
the patterns and trends in union density diverged markedly. In 2002, union density in 
the U.S. and Canada stood at approximately 12 percent and 28 percent respectively.
Chart 312
The modified card check system in place in the early 1990s led to an increase in the 
number of unionized employees, and union density across Ontario. It did so by fos­
tering organizing efforts which resulted in a significant increase in the number of ap­
plications for certification filed and the percentage of applications in which certificates 
were issued.
Notably, a 2002 research paper written by Susan Johnson comparing card 
based and secret ballot vote certifications in Canada found that the use of a card 
check system likely resulted in at least a 5 percent increase in union density in ju­
risdictions where card check was utilized.13 The paper further hypothesized that 
because certificates are granted in fewer than 65 percent of applications for certifi­
cation in the United States (the approximate union “success” rate in Canadian ju­
risdictions with secret ballot votes), the country would experience an even greater 
increase in union density if the secret ballot vote system was changed to card 
check.14 As a result, one could reasonably estimate that passage of the EFCA 
could increase the union density rates by upwards of ten percentage points and 
possibly more when one considers the other proposed amendments to the NLRA.
12 Compiled from statistical tables available from Statistics Canada (www.statcan.gc.ca) and the U.S. 
Bureau o f Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov).
13 S. Johnson, “Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote? How the type of union recognition 
procedure affects union certification success” (2002) 112 Economic Journal 344.
14 U.S., National Labour Relations Board, Seventy-First Annual Report o f the National Labour Relations 
Board for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30 2006, (Washington, D.C., (2006).
LABOUR RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON ONTARIO
In the lead-up to Bill 40’s passage in 1992, business leaders across Ontario warned 
that it was a “job killer” that would render the province “inhospitable to business”.15 
Business leaders expressed concerns that Bill 40 would discourage both foreign 
and local investment from companies wishing to remain union-free, while driving 
up the cost of collective agreements for already unionized employers who feared 
being shut down by a strike.16 The Canadian Manufacturers Association, the All 
Business Coalition, the Retail Council of Canada and the Automotive Parts Manu­
facturers’ Association, groups representing over 85 percent of Ontario employ­
ers, agreed that the Bill 40 amendments would “divert investment from Ontario 
and result in lost jobs and a reduction in [Ontario residents’] standard of living”.17
This position was supported by an Ernst & Young study commissioned in 
early 1992 which projected that, as a result of the legislation, Ontario would lose an 
estimated 300,000 jobs either through direct job loss or, possibly more importantly, 
foregone future investment.18 One business expert explained, “The laws won’t close 
industry overnight but when a company gets new orders it will merely place them 
outside the country. Subsidiaries with world product mandates will find their mandate 
will lapse...Canadian companies will open operations in the U.S. and U.S. subs will 
shift production.”19
Several policy analysts remained neutral on the Bill 40 amendments, 
but questioned their necessity and possible ramifications for the province. For ex­
ample, a C.D. Howe report which examined policy decisions of the Ontario gov­
ernment and their impact on competitiveness commented that if the cost of doing 
business rose, investment in an aggregate sectoral sense could be “hugely affected”.
Political leaders also campaigned against the legislation, stating that it 
would imply Ontario was “closed for business”, and attributed, at least in part, the 
loss of over nine thousand jobs in the province in 1992 to the proposed legislation.20
Following the implementation of the Bill 40 amendments, anecdotal evidence 
indicated that thousands of jobs were created in Michigan and New York after compa- 
nies determined that Ontario’s combination of labour laws, government regulation and
15 “Bill 40 called job Killer: Big Three say new labour law could cripple auto industry” The Globe and 
Mail (2 September 1992) B19; “Lawyer blasts labor changes” Financial Post (28 November 1991) 4.
16 Supra note 21.
17 G. Scotton, “Business takes aim at proposed labor law” Financial Post (19 June 1992) 9.
18 B. Papoe, “New labour laws would cost 300,000 jobs, report contends” Toronto Star (21 February 
1992) F3.
19 D. Francis, “Union, government greed wreak economic havoc” Financial Post (14 November 1992)
S3.
20 Wilson, Jim, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Debates (Hansard), 35th Pari., 2nd Sess. (9 July 1992), 
online: Legislative Assembly of Ontario <http://www.ontla.on.ca/house-proceedings/transcripts/files_ 
html/1992-07-09_l049.htm>.
higher taxes decreased its attractiveness as a location for investment.21 Statistics sup­
port this position, showing a drop in per capita private capital investment in Ontario 
during the period between 1991 and 1993 and a significant increase in investment fol­
lowing the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1995 (Chart 4). It is nota­
ble that this drop in investment was greater in Ontario than across the rest of the country, 
suggesting that the decrease in investment was not solely attributable to the recession.
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Business leaders attributed the depth and length o f  the recession in Ontario at least in part to 
the Bill 40 amendments. It is noteworthy that the recession in Ontario continued well into 1993 
while it ended in 1991 in most other North American jurisdictions, including the United States.23
As a result, there is little doubt that the card-based system, in conjunc­
tion with a number of labour related amendments enacted under Bill 40, con­
tributed to a reduction in investment by both Ontario and foreign investors.
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNIONIZATION
Shortly before the election of the NDP in 1990, the province of Ontario entered
21 G. Rennie, “The final straw’ for many firms: Bill 40 has Ontario companies looking across the 
boarder” The Windsor Star ( 14 May 1993) A1 and G. Rennie, “Leaving the nest: Because o f labor laws, 
businesses prefer to expect out o f  Ontario” The Windsor Star (15 May 1993) E l.
22 Canada, Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Tables 032-0002 and 051-0005.
23 National Bureau o f Economic Research, “NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee Determines that 
Recession Ended in March 1991”. NBER Online: National Bureau of Economic Research <http://www. 
nber.org/March91 ,html>.
its deepest recession since the Great Depression. Consequently, upon taking of­
fice, the NDP had to address this financial crisis, while promoting and implement­
ing its party platform of increased funding for social welfare programs. Among 
its actions were bailouts of several significant corporations, much like the finan­
cial measures that the government in the United States is currently undertaking.
At that time, business leaders commented that during difficult economic 
times the government should not saddle businesses with the additional “burden of 
unionization”—the strategic, administrative, and financial changes that occur follow­
ing the certification of a business. Of particular concern are the financial changes 
resulting from the “rent seeking” behaviour of trade unions, which is a term used to 
describe the financial windfall enjoyed by a trade union for which it does not provide 
any additional productivity or other contribution to the employer. In short, a trade 
union uses its power as the exclusive representative of employees to extract additional 
monies that would otherwise be retained by the company. It is estimated that these 
additional monies can be as much as 15 percent of payroll.24 A significant amount of 
these monies will be spent on expenses that do not increase the value of the firm or the 
wealth of employees, such as the costs associated with collective agreement negotia­
tions and administration, grievance hearings, management training, and payments to 
union funds. Unfortunately, the Ontario government did not heed this advice from the 
business community and as previously mentioned suffered through reduced invest­
ment and a prolonged recession as a result.
Applying this information to the current issues facing the Unit­
ed States leads inextricably to the question of whether the implementa­
tion of the EFCA (which, if history provides a lesson, virtually guaran­
tees an increase in union density rates) and the accompanying rent-seeking 
behaviour will be beneficial for the United States economy in the short, medium or 
long term. We suggest that the potential impact is of particular concern in three areas:
♦ Productivity and profits;
♦ Research, development, and investment expenditures; and
♦ Employment growth.
Productivity and Profits
If the increased costs caused by the rent-seeking behaviour of a trade union are offset 
with an equal or greater increase in productivity then a balance may be struck. Un­
fortunately, as discussed herein, studies have concluded that unionization generally 
results in stagnated productivity, increased absenteeism rates and, as a result, reduced 
profits.
24 P. Kuhn, “Unions and the economy: what we know; what we should know” (1998) 31 Canadian 
Journal of Economics 1033.
With respect to absenteeism, the unionization of a firm could result in 
three outcomes.25 First, the wage premium earned by the union could increase 
the opportunity cost of being away from work, creating an incentive for em­
ployees to return to work as soon as possible. Second, the increased attention to 
safety achieved by the union could reduce the number of absences connected with 
work-related illness or injuries. Third, the sick leave benefits often achieved by a 
union could provide the perverse effect of rewarding employees for missing work.
Research in both Canada and the United States has found that the first 
two outcomes appear to be overshadowed by the third, resulting in significantly 
higher rates of absenteeism for unionized employees compared to their non-union 
counterparts.26 This higher rate of absenteeism reduces productivity, as unionized 
businesses are required to make do with a workforce prone to not attending work.
Early research by well respected labour scholars Richard Freedman and 
James Medoff indicated that unionized firms achieved higher rates of productivity 
than non-union firms.27 However, over the past twenty years further research has 
indicated that a unionized firm is just as likely to see decreases in productivity as it 
is to experience increases.28 Furthermore, the more recent studies have indicated that 
many of the unionized firms which experienced an increase in productivity fall into 
one of two categories. The first category consists of unions in the construction indus­
try which have historically created sophisticated training programs that enhance the 
skills (and therefore productivity) of union members.29 The second category consists 
of firms that use co-operative management programs such as “total quality manage­
ment” and flexible compensation plans (for example, profit sharing).30 In these firms, 
the company and union agree to forgo the traditional union approach of structured 
and inflexible management with defined wages (i.e. strict job classifications and wage 
rates), thereby avoiding rent-seeking behaviour.
These studies lead to the conclusion that the unionization of a firm will 
likely have little if any positive impact and may potentially have a significant neg­
ative impact on productivity. The corollary is that the profits realized by a union­
ized firm will be less than those of an equally situated non-union firm, a conclusion 
supported by research indicating that a firm’s share price can be expected to de­
crease by approximately 3 percent and its profits to decrease by approximately 15
25 J.P. Leigh “The Effects of Union Membership on Absence from Work Due to Illness” (1981), 2 Journal 
of Labor Research 329.
26 “Work absence rates” (2007), 19:2 Perspectives on Labour and Income 58.
27 R.B. Freeman and J.L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
28 Y.R. Fuchs, A.B. Krueger and J.M. Poterba, “Economists’ Views about Parameters, Values, and 
Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics” (1998) 36 Journal of Economic Literature 1387.
29 S. Allen, “Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School Construction” (1986) 39 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review 187.
30 S.E. Black and L.M. Lynch, “How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information 
Technology on Productivity” (2001) 83:3 Review of Economics & Statistics 434.
percent in the first year following its unionization.31 The reduction in profits has 
an impact on the other two areas affected by unionization, explored further below.
Innovation and Research and Development
In 2006, American companies spent approximately $348 million on research and 
development (“R&D”).32 Approximately 66 percent of that amount was funded by 
industry.33 Companies often derive a large part of their R&D budgets from profits at­
tained in previous years.
Research has indicated that unionized companies spend less on R&D than 
their non-union counterparts. For example, a study reported in the Canadian Journal 
o f Economics attempted to determine whether a link existed between unionization 
rates and R&D rates (research and development expenditures divided by output).34 
The study considered a number of industries over an eighteen-year period and deter­
mined that unionized companies in an industry with an average unionization rate will 
experience a reduction in R&D expenditures of between 28 percent and 50 percent. 
Results in this range are also found in studies of American companies which deter­
mined that the effect of unionization is comparable to that of doubling the corporate 
tax rate.35
A decline in R&D expenditures has both short and long term effects 
on a company. In the short term, it directly causes job loss as funding reductions 
force the company to lay off scientists, engineers, and others within the R&D de­
partment. Over time, the reduction in R&D will decrease innovation resulting 
in reduced competitive advantages and, more importantly, a reduction in invest­
ment. For example, one study of newly certified companies between 1964 and 
1984 indicated an immediate reduction in investment to capital ratios following 
certification.36 This reduction primarily affected investment in physical assets, in­
cluding new technologies that would permit the companies to remain competitive 
in the long term. It follows that the reduction in R&D and investment will fur­
ther reduce profits as it will reduce the long-term returns realized by the business.
Employment Growth
31 Supra note 32.
32 M. Boroush, “New Estimates of National Research and Development Expenditures Show 5.8% Growth 
in 2007” National Science Foundation (August 2008) online: National Science Foundation <http://www. 
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33 Ibid.
34  J.R. Betts, C.W. Odgers & M.K. Wilson, “The effects of unions on research and development: an 
em pirical analysis using multi-year data” (2001) 34:3 Canadian Journal of Economics 785.
35 B.T. Hirsch, “Firm investment behaviour and collective bargaining strategy” (1992) 31 Industrial 
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36 B.C. Fallick & K.A. Hassett, “Investment and union certification” (1999) 17 Journal of Labour 
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Given the evidence that the unionization of a company will likely result in stag­
nated productivity levels and lower profits, which in turn results in a reduced em­
phasis on innovation and investment, it is not surprising that employment growth 
in unionized firms lags behind that in non-union firms. One Canadian study found 
that unionized firms grew between 3.7 percent and 3.9 percent more slowly than 
their non-union counterparts.37 Furthermore, heavily unionized industries are more 
prone to employment contractions and decreases in expansions and new ventures.
The same studies that provide evidence of impaired employment growth 
within unionized firms also indicate that complete shutdowns and bankruptcies with­
in unionized firms do not, as many perceive, outpace those of non-union firms.38 A 
common theory as to why unionized firms can remain solvent is that, as put by one 
researcher, “like successful viruses, unions are smart enough not to kill their hosts.”39 
As previously discussed, unions are generally successful in achieving a wage premium 
as a component of their rent seeking behaviour. As a result, union leaders know that 
the firm is operating with a certain level of “fat”, which can be cut away through con­
cessions when issues arise which threaten the long-term viability of the firm. Such a 
result is not available for a non-union firm which does not pay a premium as its sole 
option is to cut “meat” from its operations, thereby further damaging itself. However, 
this ability to survive should not be viewed as an ability to thrive or effectively com­
pete in a rapidly changing marketplace. Instead, it is confirmation that unionization 
creates inefficiencies that hamper the long term growth and success of the business.
FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION
Studies have shown that the few unionized firms that experience increases in productiv­
ity following certification are those that have implemented proactive human resources 
and operations strategies that they administer jointly with the union.40 In these com­
paratively rare situations, management and the union work together to achieve mutu­
ally beneficial gains and resolve issues before they cause problems in the workplace.
Such a result is incongruent with any legislation pertaining to first contract 
arbitration. Under first contract arbitration, both parties have a collective agree­
ment imposed on them, one that may upset both parties and will rarely foster trust or 
communication. Furthermore, these decisions often result in higher levels of wag­
es and benefits than those which would be achieved by free collective bargaining.
Proponents of first contract arbitration will point to statistics which indi- 
cate that it is not used in a significant number of cases. For example, during the
37 R. Long, “The effect of unionization on employment growth of Canadian companies” (1993) 46 
Industrial & Labour Relations Review 691.
38 R.B. Freeman and M. Kleiner, “Do unions make enterprises insolvent?” (1999) 52 Industrial & Labour 
Relations Review 510.
39 Supra note 32, at 1039.
40 Supra note 32.
three years it was available in Ontario between 1993 and 1996, a request for first 
contract arbitration was filed on thirty-eight occasions and arbitration was actually 
ordered only three times.41 Similarly, statistics from Quebec indicate that 10.8 per­
cent of collective agreements were signed following a request for first contract arbi­
tration, but only 2.3 percent of those agreements were actually imposed on the par­
ties.42 The remainder were settled prior to a decision being rendered at arbitration.
However, what these statistics do not expose is the underlying reason the 
parties agreed to a collective agreement prior to having one ordered by an arbitrator. 
For example, research has indicated that switching from a situation where employ­
ees have the ability to strike to one where unsuccessful collective bargaining results 
in mandatory arbitration will increase wages by between 1 percent and 2 percent.43 
Other research indicates a much greater difference between the two systems, with 
some research finding that wages dictated by an arbitrator were seventeen per cent
17 percent to 61 percent higher than in other workplaces.44 A recently imposed col­
lective agreement at a Wal-Mart facility in Quebec mandated wage increases from 
approximately $8.50 per hour to at least $11.54 per hour, with further increases to 
almost $16.00 per hour in 2010.45 When one considers the entirety of the agree­
ment, the union claims it achieved 98 percent of the provisions it requested of the 
arbitrator.46 On 16 October 2008, Wal-Mart announced that it would be closing the 
facility that had been the subject of the first contract arbitration. The financial im­
pact of the arbitrated collective agreement was cited as one reason for the closure.47
Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the rea­
son so few agreements are imposed by an arbitrator is that an employer, believ­
ing that there is nothing to be gained by proceeding to first contract arbitration, 
may choose to sign an inferior and financially damaging collective agreement.
A further problem with the proposed EFCA system is that it fails to provide 
guidance as to the considerations to be applied by the arbitrator. For example, the 
EFCA does not state whether the arbitration is to be a “final offer selection” or if the 
arbitrator can craft his or her own best result. It also does not identify comparators 
to be applied by the arbitrator when determining the contents of the collective agree­
ment. When the Public Service Staff Relations Act was created in Canada, the legisla­
41 Supra note 2.
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1986) 17.
45 Wal-Mart Canada Corp. et Travailleurs et Travailleuses Unis De L ’Alimentation et du Commerce, 
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46 J. Bertrand, “Quebec Wal-Mart gets union deal” Canada.com (15 August 2008) online: Canada.com 
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tion specifically contemplated criteria to be considered by the arbitrator, including:
♦ The needs of the Public Service for qualified employees;
♦ The conditions of employment in similar occupations 
outside the Public Service, including such geographic, in­
dustrial, and other variations as the Board may consider 
relevant;
♦ The need to maintain appropriate relationships in the con­
ditions of employment as between different grade levels 
within an occupation and as between occupations in the 
Public Service;
♦ The need to establish terms and conditions of employment 
that are fair and reasonable in relation to the qualifications 
required, the work performed, the responsibility assumed 
and the nature of the services rendered; and
♦ Any other factor that to it appears to be relevant to the 
matter in dispute.48
Identifying criteria such as those above permit the parties to under­
stand the framework within which the arbitrator will make his or her deci­
sion. At present, the EFCA does not provide this framework, which adds fur­
ther confusion and economic uncertainty to the arbitration process. This 
economic uncertainty will further hamper a newly certified employer’s abil­
ity to react to the rules and procedures inherent in a unionized workplace, which 
will only exacerbate the issues described in the previous sections of this paper.
CONCLUSION
A number of articles written about the EFCA have focused on the effect that the 
legislation might have on employee voice and choice within the workplace. This 
paper attempts to look beyond the value-based arguments for and against the 
card check certification system and instead focus on the long-term economic im­
plications for United States businesses if the Bill is put into place as proposed.
Prior to the passage of Bill 40, a policy analysis suggested that the Ontario 
government undertake a competitiveness audit that would ask the following questions:
♦ Do the proposed changes move the jurisdiction closer to, 
or further from, the labour relations regimes of competitor 
jurisdictions?
♦ Is it likely that the jurisdiction’s competitors will be moved 
to emulate the regime established by the new legislation?
_______♦ Will the differences between the regimes provide incen-
48 Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S., c. P-35, s. I; Ibid at s. 67.
tives for resources to flow into or out of the jurisdiction?
♦ Will the changes increase the efficiency with which the 
jurisdiction’s economy makes use of its existing resources 
of people, capital, technology and natural resources?49
This paper suggests that completing a competitiveness audit for the EFCA 
would result in a finding that the proposed changes move the United States away from 
the labour relations regimes of other countries, including most of Canada. Further­
more, study after study has shown that legislation like the EFCA, by increasing the 
cost of business, is likely to have a detrimental effect on employment growth, innova­
tion, and resource flow into the United States.
49 Supra note 27, at 16.
